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          Abstract 
The rise of home sharing has disrupted traditional industries and has a number of 
unforeseen societal impacts. These changes sparked policy debates on how to keep home 
sharing platforms’ rapid growth in a sustainable manner. This paper empirically 
investigates whether and how home sharing impacts the crime rate in the community. 
Using two policy changes in New York City and San Francisco to mimic an experimental 
design, and using a difference in difference model, we found a positive association 
between commercial home sharing and the increase of the crime rate. Leveraging 
instrumental variables estimation method, we further found that there is no significant 
relationship between non-commercial (authentic) home sharing and violent criminal 
activity. This paper provides empirical evidence to support policy change. It also 
contributes to the understanding of the sharing economy business model and its societal 
impacts. Further robustness checks will be implemented to validate the findings of this 
research. 
 
Keywords:  Sharing Economy, Space Sharing, Crime, Societal Impact, Commercial 
Sharing, Authentic Sharing, Difference in Difference 
 
Introduction 
The rise of sharing economy has disrupted traditional industries and has unforeseen spillover impacts on 
our society. These changes sparked a host of debates on regulations. For example, home sharing is 
accused to compete unfairly with hotels without the same safety standards and tax burdens, shrinks the 
pool of rental properties and drives up rents. Further, there are also a series of cases where the Airbnb 
guests have reported that they were discriminated (Edelman et al. 2017). Many home owners also 
complain that home sharing disrupts residential neighborhoods.  
On the other hand, as the industry leader, Airbnb is operating in more than 190 counties. In 2017, the 
company generated 2.6 billion in revenue,1 and it also brings billions in revenue to local business 
annually. While major cities around the global has started enacting policies to keep home sharing 
platforms’ rapid growth in a sustainable manner,2 empirical evidences are much needed to understand the 
social impacts of home sharing. 
 
1 https://press.airbnb.com/fast-facts/ last accessed April 28, 2018   
2 https://www.cntraveler.com/galleries/2016-06-22/places-with-strict-airbnb-laws last accessed April 28, 2018 
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One concern for home sharing has been safety issues. When Airbnb first launched, people were 
uncomfortable with the idea of bringing strangers into their homes. Airbnb however argued that this was 
an un-rational fear, as no criminal would register with their information such as photo and identification, 
and then commit a crime. The platform has since provided a number of ways for security screening of the 
guests, such as ID verifications, and social media integrations. However, preliminary studies and news 
often report that Airbnb’s operation is associated with crimes in neighborhoods (Xu et al. 2017). Thus, it is 
imperative to understand if the home sharing impacts crime activity. In this paper we seek to empirically 
investigate this possible relationship. 
As home sharing has proven to be profitable, there are increasing commercialized and institutionalized 
hosts running hotel-like operations on Airbnb. They are different from everyday authentic hosts in nature. 
For traceability, we define the commercial listings adopting San Francisco city government’s definition: A 
commercial listing is when the listing is not the primary residence (the property where the host lives for at 
least 275 days per year) of the host.  In this paper, leveraging the routine activity theory, we aim to 
understand the mechanism through which Airbnb impacts crime rate: whether there are differences 
between the impacts of commercial versus authentic sharing on crime rate. 
Using policy changes in San Francisco and New York City targeted at commercial listings as exogenous 
shocks, we utilize difference in difference (DID) approach to test the impact of commercial sharing on 
crime rate. Following prior research, we use dynamic DID model to validate the parallel trend 
assumption. To identify the impact of increase in authentic Airbnb occupancy on the increase in crime 
rate, we use instrument variables to investigate such relationship in neighborhoods in San Francisco, after 
commercial listings are eliminated from the market due to the policy change.  
The preliminary results show that commercial home sharing is positively associated with all types of crime 
rates. Whereas authentic sharing has a much weaker impact on crime rate and is not associated with 
violent crimes.  
Theoretically, this paper adds interesting nuances to the growing discussion of sharing economy. It 
highlights the differences between institutional/ commercial listings and authentic sharing regarding 
their impacts on community. Specifically, commoditization changes the market structure, the nature of 
the business, and eliminates security measures enabled by peer-to-peer interactions. These findings 
provide empirical supports for current regulations that treat commercial and authentic hosts as different 
stakeholders in this market space. 
As a research-in-progress paper, our model and findings need further validation. We would further 
develop this paper by adding a number of robustness checks to validate our findings.  
Related Literature 
There are many debates on the benefits as well as the dark sides of sharing economy (Malhotra and Van 
Alstyne 2014; Schor 2016). For example, its potential benefit to sustainability (Heinrichs 2013), the promise 
to help the unemployed and financially struggling individuals generate temporary employment (Dillahunt 
and Malone 2015) is often juxtaposed against the unfavorable working conditions, lack of insurance, the 
potential threat to consumer safety, and other regulation challenges (Malhotra and Van Alstyne 2014).  
The economic impact and spillover effects of sharing economy has been quantified in several studies. For 
example, Zervas et al. (2017) found that the impacts of Airbnb on hotel industry are distributed unevenly 
across the industry, with lower-end hotels and hotels not catering to business travelers being the most 
affected ones. A study on the effect of Uber on taxis in New York and Chicago showed a reduction in 
complaints as the alternative offer grows, which can be interpreted as taxis being forced to improve quality 
in fear of being driven out of business (Wallsten 2015). Greenwood and Wattal (2017) showed how the entry 
of the driving service Uber influenced the rate of alcohol-related motor vehicle homicides. 
Policy and legal issues are amongst the most hotly debated topics in research and practice, as sharing 
economy practices do not neatly fall into traditional legal categories (Katz 2015). Policy makers often need 
to re-examine and balance the regulations considering the benefits from innovation while at the same time 
ensuring the protection of users from fraud, liability, and practices that might endanger public health or 
safety (Koopman et al. 2015).  
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In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of home sharing on crime rate, to provide better 
understanding of the social impact of home sharing and provide evidence to ground policy making. 
Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
Over the last century, the sociology literature and criminology literature has been discussing  the generation 
of illegal acts due to community structures (Eck and Weisburd 2015). Several theoretical perspectives, such 
as rational choice, routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) and crime pattern theory, have improved 
our understanding regarding crime prevention. Particularly, routine activity theory seeks to understand the 
occurrence of crime events as the joint influence of several factors, including the presence of a motivated 
offender, a suitable target, and the absence of the intimate handlers (e.g., the individuals who can influence 
the offender), guardians (e.g., protectors of the targets), and place managers, who take care of the places 
(e.g., apartment managers) (Cohen and Felson 1979). While engaging in their illegal activities, rational 
offenders will note places where the handlers, guardians and managers are unlikely to show up (Eck and 
Weisburd 2015). For example, the routine activities performed near the home and among family (or other 
primary groups) can entail lower risk of criminal victimization because of high level of guardianship 
capabilities (Cohen and Felson 1979).  
This theory underpinning can be extended to our context, as it emphasized the “space” where the criminal 
event occurs (Cohen and Felson 1979). As noted earlier, commercial home sharing differs from authentic 
home sharing in that the property owner is not present, and they are solely profit driven with little safety 
concerns. In these properties, the guests live alone or share space with other guests. We argue that such 
phenomenon is associated with an increase crime rate for at least two reasons. Specifically, we examine the 
guests from two standpoints with regard to their role in the criminal events. First, the guests could be 
attributed to the “target” of the criminal event. In this case, the “motivated offenders” are the individuals 
who reside in the community, but are external to the focal property. Without the property owner showing 
up, the “place manager”, and also to some extent, the “guardians” of the guests, is absence. This will make 
the guests and the property itself relatively vulnerable, and the crime rate in this circumstance is likely to 
rise accordingly. Furthermore, the commercial home sharing is more like a hotel business model rather 
than a “sharing” economy model. This nature also bears a higher likelihood of criminal victimizations, as 
previous studies have shown that the hotel industry is very susceptive to criminal activities (Ho et al. 2009). 
To compete with hotels, the commercial hosts often rent out rooms in an apartment or a house to different 
parties to reduce the price per room, these parties share the common area in the property. This model 
without the presence of managers increases the odds of criminal activity among renters. 
Second, the guests could potentially be “motivated offenders”. Not living in the properties, the commercial 
hosts have low incentives to screening the guests, thus bringing suspect guests into the neighborhood. This 
effect is amplified, when a special feature popularized by Airbnb in 2014, namely “instant bookable”, by 
which the hosts forgo screening of the guests’ credibility, and the guests are able to book a listing instantly 
without gaining hosts’ approval (Mayya et al. 2017). Again, due to the absence of the hosts, and the lack of 
security screening, guests are free from “intimate handlers” and the “place manager”, and they are more 
likely to engage in illegal activities either within the property such as drug abuse, drug trafficking and sex 
trade or outside in the neighborhood such as theft, robbery and rape.  
In sum, the absence of hosts in the property, and the lack of incentive to screening the guests may induce 
illegal activity in the community regardless if the guests are the “target” or the “offender” in the criminal 
events. Taken together, it is our belief that the commercial home sharing is positively related to the increase 
of crime activity in the community.  
In contrast to commercial home sharing, non-commercial home sharing, where hosts share their space with 
guests, is the business model on which the sharing economy relied to take off. In this case, the hosts are 
mostly present during the guests’ stay, they thus play the role of the “intimate handlers”, the “guardian”, 
and “place manager” in the same time, as the routine activity theory indicates. Therefore, the potential 
offenders such as the guests who are inclined to engage in crime otherwise or the potential criminals from 
the neighborhood are effectively deterred. To protect themselves and their families’ safety, the non-
commercial hosts are likely to carefully screen the guests’ background, and reduce the likelihood of suspect 
guests entering the neighborhood. Moreover, the hosts themselves could be low income families that 
struggle financially. The financial gain in these families and in a struggling neighborhood can prevent these 
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hosts themselves from engaging in illegal activities such as theft or drug dealing. Ceteris paribus, we do not 
expect there is an evident association between the non-commercial home sharing business model and crime 
rate in the community. In sum, we hypothesize, 
Hypothesis A: Commercial Home Sharing is positively associated with the increase of crime rate. 
Hypothesis B: Non - commercial Home Sharing has no association with the increase of crime rate. 
Research Methodology 
Background 
Airbnb is an online marketplace and hospitality service for people to lease or rent short-term lodging. The 
business mobilizes individuals to provide services by allowing them to access the user pool, mediating and 
securing transactions, and supporting the hosts with an eco-system. As the leading home sharing platform, 
Airbnb has over 4 million lodging listings in 65,000 cities in 191 countries, and has facilitated over 260 
million check-ins as of January, 2018.3 
With the rapid growth, home sharing platforms also faced a number of social economic issues. Cities around 
the world started enacting policies to regulate home sharing platforms. In the following sections, we firstly 
examine the impact of commercial sharing on crime rate, and we then investigate the association between 
non-commercial (authentic) sharing and crime rate.  
Commercial Sharing  
Data and Measures 
We collect incident level crime report from San Francisco and New York City police department from Jan 
2016 to Dec 2018. The reports include the details of each incident such as time, location, crime types, 
suspect, victims, and the resolutions. The descriptive statistics of the crime data is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Type of Crime NYC mean NYC SD SF mean SF SD 
Theft 2175.43 232.95 384.03 456.96 
Assault 1207.56 120.60 107.58 125.63 
Burglary 203.22 26.37 59.47 62.85 
Drug 331.31 75.56 32.27 39.31 
Robbery 235.30 36.49 32.60 33.80 
Sex  121.32 18.10 15.07 14.29 
Vehicle Theft 96.68 14.28 52.80 58.09 
Weapon 150.04 27.77 23.17 19.43 
Notes: The values shown in this table indicate the number of incidents per month per district. 
Econometric Identification 
Our econometric identification hinges on two policy changes targeting commercial listings on Airbnb in San 
Francisco and New York City as exogenous shocks. The first policy change took place in Jan 2018 in San 
Francisco. Specifically, the city required Airbnb to share hosts’ data with them; and also, hosts can only rent 
out their primary residence. The number of listings in San Francisco plunged by half after the enactment of 
the policy because commercial listings (where the property is not the primary residence of the hosts) were 
 
3 https://press.atairbnb.com/fast-facts/ last accessed April 28, 2018 
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no longer allowed.4  The second policy change happened in June 2018 in New York City. A similar law as 
the one implemented in San Francisco was passed. However, Airbnb claimed that the city violated the hosts’ 
Fourth Amendment right against illegal search and won the law suit against the city, and as a result, the law 
was not strictly enforced. Nonetheless, we reckon that this event still had moderate impact on the reduction 
of commercial listing because some hosts might remove their commercial listings for the possible 
implementation of the policy. Based on hypothesis A, we expect to see a significant drop of crime rate in 
San Francisco after the policy was implemented, and a weaker effect in New York City after the event took 
place. Merely comparing the crime rates of a city before and after the policy could potentially bias our 
estimation, due to endogeneity issue. For example, there might be temporal changes that impact the crime 
rate (e.g., the crime rate is increasing or decreasing) across all cities over the time period in the study, even 
in cities with no policy enforced on Airbnb. This underlying (unobserved) trend of crime rate would over-
estimate (or under-estimate) the impact of Airbnb on crime rate, if we do not consider a more robust 
method to mitigate it. DID model provides a solution for addressing the potential endogeneity issues. 
The primary benefits of DID model is that we can mimic an experimental design using observational data 
because the treatments are applied in different locations and at different times (Greenwood and Wattal 
2017; Huang et al. 2017). DID is a common approach, frequently used to establish causal relationships in 
data when experimental manipulation is difficult to implement.  
Estimation Model 
We estimate the two-treatment DID models reflected by equation (1). Our estimation controls for district 
level fixed effects to control for district-level unobserved heterogeneity.  
ln(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0𝑆𝐹 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐹_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐹 ∗ 𝑆𝐹_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡 
                                                              +𝛽3𝑁𝑌𝐶_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡+𝛽4𝑁𝑌𝐶 ∗ 𝑁𝑌𝐶_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (1) 
In this equation, i indexes police district, and t indexes month. 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the number of crime 
incidents in district i in month t. SF is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if the observation pertains to 
crime incident in San Francisco, and 0 if the observation is from NYC. SF_change (similarly 
NYC_change) is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for observations that took place following the 
policy change in San Francisco (similarly in New York City).  The key parameters of interest are 𝛽2 and 𝛽4. 
𝛽2 estimates the effect of policy change in San Francisco on CrimeRate relative to New York’s crime rate 
before the policy change. 𝛽4estimates the effect of policy change in New York on CrimeRate relative to San 
Francisco’s crime rate before New York’s policy change. If both coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant, they indicate a significant drop in crime rate after the implementation of the policies. In other 
words, there would be a positive relationship between commercial home sharing and crime activity.  
Preliminary Results 
In this section, we report the results of the DID estimation. Because the distributions of our dependent 
variable are skewed, we report estimation results using log-transformed outcome variables in Table 2. The 
three crime categorizations in Table 2, namely Personal Crimes, Property Crimes, and Other Crimes were 
adapted from the police report collected from the police departments of SF and NYC. We also report 
estimations based on a dynamic specification around the San Francisco intervention. This specification 
provides us with the dynamic effects of prohibiting commercial home sharing on crime rate, as well as a 
means of evaluating the parallel trends assumption.  
Table 2. Effect of Commercial Home Sharing on Crime Rate 
 Personal Crimes Property Crimes Other Crimes 
 
4 https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Airbnb-listings-in-San-Francisco-plunge-by-half-12502075.php last accessed April 
28, 2018 
 
 The Impact of Home Sharing on Crime Rate 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 6 
Variables Ln 
(Assault) 
Ln 
(Sex) 
Ln 
(Theft) 
Ln 
(Vehicle 
Theft) 
Ln 
(Burglary) 
Ln 
(Robbery) 
Ln 
(Drug) 
Ln 
(Weapon) 
Constant  7.19*** 3.93*** 7.74*** 4.47*** 5.02*** 4.80*** 5.49*** 4.22*** 
SF_change -2.47*** -1.16** -2.46*** -2.13*** -2.49*** -2.14*** -2.81*** -1.66*** 
SF -0.48 -1.32* 0.15 1.97** 0.89 0.76 0.09 0.69 
NYC_change 2.79*** 1.12** 3.05 2.07*** 2.65*** 2.18*** 2.38*** 1.19** 
SF*SF_cha
nge 
-2.61*** -1.17* -3.06*** -2.26*** -2.28*** -1.93*** -1.99** -1.04* 
NYC*NYC_
change 
-0.66^ -0.40 -0.85* -0.13 -0.27 -0.38 0.28 0.44 
Observation 519 397 545 486 490 448 428 408 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.81 0.77 0.80 0.66 0.40 0.76 0.75 0.76 
District fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, ^ p<0.1  
A key identification assumption of the DID specification is the existence of parallel trend between the 
treatment and control group, leading up to the treatment. Under a dynamic DID specification, it is possible 
to test the parallel assumption explicitly. In particular, by interacting the treatment and indicator with time 
dummies, we can explore relative changes in the trends of our dependent variables across the treatment 
and control groups around the time of treatment. This approach has been extensively used in prior IS 
research (Greenwood and Wattal 2017; Huang et al. 2017). 
Since San Francisco had the strict prohibition of commercial home sharing, while New York City’s law was 
not fully enforced, the effect is expected to be more salient in San Francisco. Therefore, following methods 
implemented in prior research (Huang et al. 2017), we use the time window around San Francisco’s 
exogenous shock to examine the relative difference in difference in our dependent carriables, before and 
after the event. In our estimation, we include a platform fixed effect, SF, a set of absolute time (month) 
dummies 𝜆𝑡, the interaction terms of time dummies and treatment dummy 𝑆𝐹 ∗ 𝜆𝑡, and a vector of district 
fixed effects 𝑢𝑖. The estimation model is presented in equation (2). We plot the coefficients associated with 
each platform and time interaction 𝑆𝐹 ∗ 𝜆𝑡, 6 months before and after the intervention.  
ln(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝑆𝐹 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑆𝐹 ∗ 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 
Figure 1 presents the visualizations of the coefficient estimation associated with our time dummy 
interactions for our DVs. As shown, we observe no evidence of pre-treatment trends that lie in the same 
direction as the post-treatment trend. Accordingly, although the pre-treatment trends are not strictly 
parallel, the fact that the treatment drives a near immediate reversal in the difference in differences suggest 
that we have identified the true treatment effect (Huang et al. 2017).  
 
Assault 
 
Sex 
 
Theft 
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Vehicle_Theft  
  
Burglary 
 
Robbery 
 
Drug 
 
Weapon 
 
Notes: the above figures presents the visualizations of the coefficient estimation associated with our time dummy 
interactions for our DVs, i.e., the incident rate of different types of crime. 
Figure 1. Visualization of treatment effect over time on DVs 
As shown in Table 2, the coefficients of the interaction between platform and treatment dummies for San 
Francisco across all DVs are negative and statistically significant, indicating that the reduction of 
commercial listings are associated with lower crime rate. Thus, strictly prohibiting commercial home 
sharing (as implemented in San Francisco) significantly reduce crime rate in all categories. Furthermore, 
when home sharing law is not strictly enforced, there will be limited reduction in the number of commercial 
listings, and accordingly, less reduction in crime rate. As indicated in Table 2, after the law was enacted in 
New York City, crime rates of the most common crimes, i.e. Assault and Theft significantly decreased, while 
other crimes did not significantly change. These preliminary results confirm our Hypothesis A that 
commercial home sharing is positively associated with crime rate.  
Authentic sharing 
Data and Measures 
We collected incident level crime report from San Francisco from Feb 2018 to Feb 2019, in which the 
commercial listings are eliminated. Incidents are aggregated by zip code per month by crime type. To 
estimate the Airbnb occupancy, we use review volume as a proxy. This proxy is widely used to measure 
occupancy (Öğüt and Onur Taş 2012).   
Econometric Identification 
Following the prior literature on weather instruments (Kumar et al. 2018), our empirical strategy is to 
instrument for the number of reviews made in month t in zip code j, with exogenous weather shocks in 
period t (month). We use number of days in a month that is raining, hot (temperature>85 F), or cold 
(temperature<35 F), to measure the weather condition. The intuition is that, these severe weather 
conditions can influence people’s willingness to travel, thus, impact the occupation rate of Airbnb listings. 
While these weather conditions should not directly impact the crime rate. Our estimation model is 
presented in equations (3) and (4).  
ln (𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝑎 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + βln (𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡   (3) 
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ln (𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡) = (𝜇 + 𝑢𝑖) + 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (4) 
where 𝜆𝑡  is the time (month) fixed effect, and 𝑢𝑖  is the zip code fixed effect. To test the validity of the 
instrument variable we first test the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable 
(Angrist et al. 1996; Hong and Pavlou 2017; Wooldridge 2010), we observe a significant negative correlation 
(t = -3.75, p-value <0.001). We then conducted the weak identification test. In case of a single instrument 
and a single endogenous regressor, in the first stage model, the absolute t value for the instrument should 
be bigger than 3.2 or the corresponding p-value should be below 0.0016. We found that t=-4.18, and p-
value<0.001. Thus, a weak instrument is not a concern (Hill et al. 2008). Note that we will use alternative 
instrument variables, such as the intensity of Uber activity in the city in future robustness tests. 
Preliminary Results 
The estimation results of equation (3) are presented in Table 3.  
Table 3. Effect of Authentic Home Sharing on Crime Rate 
 Personal Crimes Property Crimes Other Crimes Overall 
Variables Ln 
(Assault) 
Ln 
(Sex) 
Ln 
(Theft) 
Ln 
(Vehicle 
Theft) 
Ln 
(Burglary
) 
Ln 
(Robbery) 
Ln 
(Drug) 
Ln 
(Weapon) 
Ln 
(CrimeRate) 
Constant  -0.17 -1.67 -0.49 -0.11 -0.59 -0.10 -2.63^ -1.45* -0.14* 
Occupancy 0.64 0.49 0.36 0.07 0.18 0.04 0.77^ 0.43* 0.08^ 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.89 0.81 0.97 0.86 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.69 0.83 
Zipcode 
fixed effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month 
fixed effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, ^ p<0.1  
 
As shown in Table 3, the coefficients of Occupancy are not significant for violent crimes such as assault, sex 
offence, etc., which suggest that, the increase in occupancy in Airbnb hosted by authentic hosts is not 
significantly related to crime rate in violent crimes. However, there is significant increase in drug related 
and weapon related crimes. One possible explanation could be, although the presence of the hosts can 
alleviate the issue of violent crimes, the guests may still engage in non-violent crimes such as drug abuse or 
drug dealing. Also, they may not aware of the gun laws of California, and therefore violates the gun law 
regarding sales and possession of weapon. 
Discussion  
The preliminary results of this study suggest that, commercial home sharing is associated with all types of 
crime rates. Authentic home sharing has minor impact on crime rate, with just some specific types of crimes 
being induced. These results add to the understanding of the nature of sharing economy, and the 
phenomenon of commoditization/ institutionalization on these platforms. Following the call to understand 
the transformation from sharing based on the desire for human connection, to sharing that is meld with 
commercial objectives (Sundararajan 2019), we will further analyze the underlying mechanisms of how 
these modes of sharing impact crime rate.   
This study also has the potential to provide empirical evidence for policy making. On one hand, sharing 
economy platforms rely on digital trust systems to self-regulate platform users. On the other hand, 
increasing number of city governments are implementing various policies to regulate sharing economy 
platforms. Empirical studies can provide evidence and shed light on how platforms and government can 
work together to mitigate the negative spillover effects of these platforms.    
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Future Directions 
We plan to perform additional robustness checks to validate our results. For example, we would change the 
length of time windows to validate our estimation results in the future analysis. We could also add other un 
treated cities as control group. Moreover, we would use alternative instrument variables to further address 
the potential endogeneity issue. Lastly, this study shows that the commercial listing and authentic listing 
have different impacts on crime rate; it would be interesting to test when both types of listings are present, 
the overall effect of Airbnb on criminal activity.  
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